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
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Special Analysis

USSR-Western Europe: Impact of Expulsion of Soviets 7

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GUATEMALA: Army Success Delays Guerrillas		
Extensive sweep operations by the Army probab the insurgents' planned offensive.	bly have delayed	2
	lle bees in Con	2
The Army late last month overran a large guerri Marcos Department run jointly by the two largest in reportedly served as a major logistics and training of	surgent groups. It	
claims to have inflicted heavy casualties on the insu	rgents.	25)
Earlier, the Army launched a sweep along the M		
an unsuccessful attempt to intercept a large shipme	ent of arms	
Comment : The renewed sweep operations prol disrupt guerrilla plans to prevent President Rios Mo		
state of siege last month. In addition,		25
The insurgents appear to be cooperating more clost they are intent on conducting new attacks to demo		
not been defeated.	nstrate they have	2

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
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CHAD: Government Deployments	
The rapid buildup of forces in northern Chad makes a resumption of clashes likely, despite the UN Security Council's statement this week calling on Chad and Libya to resolve their differences	
peacefully.	25 X 1
The Security Council's statement appeals to the two countries to make the fullest use of the OAU. Nonaligned members of the Council resisted intense Soviet and Libyan pressure to block the statement.	
	25 X 1
Chadian President Habre continues to reinforce his strongholds at Faya-Largeau and Fada and is moving to establish forward bases nearer the Libyan-backed dissidents' positions. Government officials claim to have deployed almost 5,000 troops in the north and say they have started patrolling the area.	
lack of pay is causing morale problems, particularly among southern troops reluctant to fight in the north.	
particularly among southern troops relactant to fight in the north.	25X1
According to Chadian officials, the rebel force at Ounianga Kebir is plaqued by desertions and severe internal dissension.	
	2071.
Comment: The Security Council statement sets a precedent for Council involvement. Strong Nonaligned support may encourage Chad to return to the Council to focus international attention on Libya's activities. Prospects for any OAU success on this issue are	
bleak, however, because of disarray in the organization.	25 X 1
With the UN vote over and the rainy season approaching, Habre is likely to move on the dissidents soon. Both sides are aware that the resupply of Faya-Largeau and Fada by land will be difficult after the May rains begin. The careful step-by-step buildup by Habre's forces contrasts with their often impulsive tactics of the past and increases their prospects for successfully engaging the Libyan-backed rebels.	
then prospects for educationary engaging the Elbyun educate robots.	25X1





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IRAN-IRAQ: Policies on Oil Spill		
Both Iran and Iraq are primarily concerned with advance related goals in dealing with the oil spill in the Persian Gulf.		 1
<u> </u>	25)	K 1
An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 barrels a day continue to f the damaged oil platforms. Some reports put the current di of the slick at several kilometers wide and more than 200 k long. Shifting winds so far have kept the oil from coming as large quantities, but the slick has reached as far south as the	imensions cilometers shore in	
Arab Emirates.	25)	(1
The latest round of talks among the eight states of the Gulf affected by the slick adjourned without an agreement		
The representatives are to reconvene next Wednesday.	25)	
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The slick still threatens to disrupt the operation of vital desalination plants in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. In addition, normal transshipments of goods could be affected if the main body of the slick approaches harbor areas.

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EL SALVADOR: Insurgent Leader Killed	
The murder of Salvadoran insurgent leader Melida Anaya Montes—known as Ana Maria—in Nicaragua on Wednesday may	
have been the result of factional rivalry within her guerrilla organization. She was the second-ranking commander of the largest	
and most militant insurgent group in El Salvador, the Farabundo	
Marti Popular Liberation Forces. Last year there were reports that she was trying to seize leadership of the organization.	
Ana Maria was considered more moderate than Cayetano Carpio,	
the titular head of the organization. She had supported closer	
cooperation with less hardline insurgent groups. In April 1981 she was criticized by Carpio for publicly advocating negotiations with the	
Salvadoran Government.	

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Special Analysis	
USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: Impact of Expulsion of Soviets	
The recent arrests and expulsions of numerous Soviet intelligence officers from Western Europe will deal an immediate, serious blow to the USSR's clandestine collection of technology and other information and to its covert action efforts. Although Moscow probably will retaliate to some degree, in doing so it will try to limit the damage to its major objectives in Western Europe, primarily the prevention of INF deployments.	25 X 1
UNCODED:he well-publicized expulsions tuncoded two weeks by France, Spain, and the UK,	25X1 25X1 25X1
The Soviets are particularly anxious to cultivate a favorable reputation in Western Europe at this time, with NATO's initial INF deployments looming and with Soviet-US relations at low ebb. Moscow already is attempting to portray the arrests and expulsions as a result of a US-arranged campaign in order to absolve the Europeans of some responsibility and to justify continued good relations.	25X1
A significant number of the Soviet intelligence officers had been collecting sensitive technological information, much of it military related.	25X1
When the 47 Soviets were expelled from France last Tuesday, the French Interior Ministry announced that the USSR was systematically seeking "scientific, technical, and technological information, particularly in the military domain."	25X1

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Unless the West Europeans keep a wintelligence activities, however, the impact	
USSR's clandestine collection of technological	
limited duration.	
Soviet Retaliation	
T. O. I. S. I. S. I.	swarned the French
The Soviet Embassy in Paris Government publicly that it bore full resp	warned the French
consequences of the mass expulsion.	25
The LICCE almost cortainly will expel	some West European
The USSR almost certainly will expel officials, as it has done in past similar situ	
however, to take such drastic actions tha	t Western governments
would reconsider the very basis of their rethe very least, that would invite further la	
the very least, that would hivite further la	ge-scale expulsions.
Impact on Anti-INF Campaign	
The Soviets would like to put the exp	ulsions affair behind them
quickly. It restricts intelligence collection,	, and it damages the picture
of a responsible, peace-loving USSR that anxious to present to the West European	
anxious to present to the west European	s tills year.
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The Soviets appear to be at pains to reassure the West Europeans that they will not allow the expulsions to damage relations over the long term.

At present, the Soviets appear to see no immediate threat to their anti-INF campaign in the West, although they presumably are upset about the positive reaction thus far to the new US proposal on INF. They suspect that the proposal was timed before Easter to reduce participation in demonstrations in Western Europe.

Nevertheless, the Soviets were pleased by those demonstrations and will encourage a steady growth of opposition to INF as the date for the initial NATO deployments approaches. The tone of Foreign Minister Gromyko's public rejection last weekend of the US offer of an interim solution suggests Moscow has decided to tough it out, hoping a hard line will force a last-minute collapse of NATO's consensus on deployment without any compromise of Moscow's INF position.

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